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JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW.

New York: Oceana Publishing, 1992. xliii + 633pp. & Index.
LAWRENCE FREEDMAN AND EFRAIM KARSH, THE GULF CONFLICT, 1990- 1991:
DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER.

Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1993. xix + 442pp. & Index.

Reviewed by Majid Khadduri*
These two works on the Gulf crisis, produced by three different
authors - one, a lawyer, and the others, specialists in international
affairs - should not be expected by readers to be on the same level in
breadth and depth. While the book by John Norton Moore, a lawyer, is
strictly legal in method and style, and is addressed primarily to readers
well versed in international law, the other work, by Lawrence Freedman
and Efraim Karsh, is lucid in style and broader in scope, and provides
an excellent introduction to readers of Moore's legal piece, which lacks
the historical and political backgrounds relevant to the legal problems,
background which the author seems to have taken for granted.
I. MOORE'S Crisis in the Gulf. Enforcing the Rule of Law
The work on the legal aspects of the Gulf conflict, entitled Crisis in
the Gulf: Enforcing the Rule of Law, is' from the pen of John Norton
Moore, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law. A
specialist in international law, Moore has published several studies on
the subject and served as a counselor to various organizations, including
the United Nations and the U.S. State Department. His special qualification for authoring a massive volume on the Gulf crisis, containing
almost all the relevant documents on the subject, is his personal experience with the subject-matter of the book. Moore has served as a
legal adviser to the Representative of the State of Kuwait in the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Committee, a body whose

function was to demarcate the frontier between Kuwait and Iraq. He
visited Kuwait following its liberation from Iraqi occupation and had at
his disposal all the official documents relevant to the border issue.

*

University Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus, The Johns Hopkins School of

Advanced International Studies.
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The purpose of Moore's book is to examine most of the essential
legal problems that arose from the time Kuwait was invaded by Iraq on
August 2, 1990, to the time of its liberation, seven months later. He
addresses himself to a number of questions, such as: Was Iraq's action
to invade Kuwait lawful or unlawful? If unlawful, what laws did Iraq
violate?
Iraq's action, Moore argues, was a challenge to the rule of law. The
response to the invasion came from both the regional and international
communities. On what legal grounds, Moore inquires, was this response
based? Iraq, in defending its actions, sought in vain to rebut the legal
arguments made against it. Needless to say, the occupation of Kuwait
was finally terminated by the enforcement of mandatory U.N. resolutions under chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.'
The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq created a complex set of legal
problems. Did Iraq commit any crime during its occupation of Kuwait?
Did it cause damage to Kuwait's people? Should Iraq be held liable to
Kuwait for reparations? To all of these specific questions, Moore seeks
to reply persuasively. However, this reviewer takes exception to some of
Moore's answers.
The book opens with a short introductory chapter on Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, followed by another in which Moore demonstrates (with
full citations from the U.N. Charter, treaties, and other international
instruments) the unlawfulness of Iraq's actions. This reviewer has no
quarrel with Moore's argument that Iraq had violated the norms of international law and the U.N. Charter by its invasion of Kuwait, as well as
its subsequent annexation of the country as its 19th province. Indeed,
the reviewer shares Moore's legal opinion and judgment.
Rather, this reviewer objects to Moore's use of harsh subjective terms,
which are commonly employed by newspaper reporters, whom scholars
are not expected to emulate. For example, he states that "a massive Iraqi
force attacked Kuwait; ' 2 he refers to Iraq's "brutal campaign; ' 3 and he
alludes to Iraq's use of "sulfuric acid and other horrors;"'4 and he comments that Iraq's acts were undertaken "in a sickeningly cynical manner."5
With regard to Saddam Husayn, President of Iraq, Moore describes him
as a "world-class thug[]." 6 These and several other statements in almost

1. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
2. JOHN NORTON MOORE, CRISIS IN THE GULF: ENFORCING THE RULE OF LAW 3

3.
4.
5.
6.

I at 3.
1d at 4.
Id at 5.
Id at 7.

(1992).
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all parts of the book reveal emotional reactions which detract from the
credibility of an otherwise serious scholarly legal work.
Nor are these statements all factually correct. Moore does not mention
the numerical strength of the "massive" Iraqi force. (It has been reported
in the press and by several writers as over 600,000.) The use of sulfuric
acid which Moore attributes to Iraq has also been reported in the press.
However, it has been revealed recently that the size of the Iraqi force that
invaded Kuwait was highly exaggerated, as it hardly exceeded half the
estimated number. Further, there is no evidence as yet that Iraq used any
chemical or biological weapons in the Coalition War.
As stated above, this reviewer shares Moore's view that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait violated the U.N. Charter and other international
instruments. However, there is also another international instrument which
is directly relevant to the case of Kuwait. On February 8, 1980, Iraq
proclaimed "The Arab National Declaration,"7 creating an Arab Pact to
renounce war among Arab countries (along the lines of the Kellogg-Briand
Pact of 19288), to which several Arab countries had acceded. Under article
2, the Arab Declaration states that "the use of armed forces by any Arab
country against any other Arab country" is prohibited and "all disputes
that may arise among Arab countries shall be settled by peaceful means." 9
By invading Kuwait, Saddam Husayn, who had himself proclaimed the
Declaration a decade earlier, obviously violated the very instrument that
called for the renunciation of force and the use of peaceful means for
settlement of disputes among Arab countries.
Moore's second major critique of Iraqi actions concerns Iraq's
disregard for almost all U.N. resolutions and its attempts to frustrate the
efforts of countries that sought to enforce the U.N. sanctions. In its first
and perhaps most important resolution, Resolution 660,'0 the Security
Council demanded "that Iraq withdraw immediately and unconditionally
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on 1 August
1990.""
7. For a discussion of the Arab National Declaration, see
WAR: THE ORIGINS AND

IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ-IRAN

MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF
CONFLICT 119, 120 (1988)

[hereinafter THE GULF WAR]. The text of this 1980 declaration is cited as the NationalDeclaration of President Saddam Hussein (February 8, 1980), in THE IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT 167-70
(Nicola Firzli ed., 1981).
8. Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, Aug.
27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 (entered into force July 24, 1929).
9. Firzli, supra note 7, at 168 (citing the Arab National Declaration, art. 2).
10. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), cited
in MOORE, supra note 2, at 403.
11. Id
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On August 6, 1990, the Security Council imposed economic sanctions
against Iraq because Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait. 12 On August
9, 1990, the Security Council reiterated the demand for withdrawal and
denounced Iraq's annexation of Kuwait as "null and void" and demanded
"that Iraq rescind its actions purporting to annex Kuwait."' 3 A set of other
resolutions dealing with several specific issues, such as the holding of
foreign nationals in Iraq as hostages (August 18, 1990),"4 violence against
foreign embassies (September 16, 1990),"s and violations of human rights
and the use of torture in Kuwait,16 were also issued.
Because of concerns that economic sanctions might not succeed in
inducing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, and despite attempts by several
missions dispatched to Baghdad to persuade the Iraqi leadership to do so,
the Security Council passed Resolution 678 (November 29, 1990).17 This
Resolution authorized the use of force under chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter in the event that Iraq did not withdraw from Kuwait on or before
January 15, 1991. The text of Resolution 678 (1991) reads as follows:
The Security Council,. . . [aicting Under Chapter VII of the Charter,
(1)Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and
all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining
all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of
goodwill, to do so;
(2) Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements,
as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use
all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international
peace and security in the area.Is
Moore has argued in favor of the lawfulness of all of the U.N. resolutions, particularly Resolution 678 which he defends with great enthusiasm

12. This was accomplished by Security Council Resolution 661, S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/661 (1990), cited in MOORE, supra note 2, at 403,
404.
13. S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/662 (1990), cited
in MOORE, supra note 2, at 406, 407.
14. S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/664 (1990), cited
in MOORE, supra note 2, at 407.
15. S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2940th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/667 (1990), cited
in MOORE, supra note 2, at 411.
16. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/674
(1990), cited in Moore, supra note 2, at 416.
17. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990), cited
in MOORE, supra note 2, at 420.
18. Id.
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because it became the subject of criticism not only by several members
of the Security Council, but also by lawyers and diplomats.' 9 In his
defense of Resolution 678, Moore argues that there were "two sufficient
and independent legal bases for coalition nations to have assisted Kuwait
in resisting and ending the illegal Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and in
restoring the international rule of law."20 First, he cites the Security
Council authorization, pursuant to chapter VII, for the "use (of) all
necessary means" by U.N. members to implement Resolution 660 (1990)
and to restore international peace and security in the area.2' Second, he
argues that the United States and other members of the United Nations
were requested by the Government of Kuwait to assist it, under "the right
of individual and collective defence" of article 51 of the U.N. Charter.22
The Amir of Kuwait had, indeed, requested in a letter to President Bush,
dated August 12, 1990, that the United States (and Great Britain) exercise
the right of individual and collective defense under article 51.21
The justification of Resolution 678 (1990) under article 51 was
criticized, on both legal and political grounds, during discussions at the
Security Council by the Iraqi representative, Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, a
lawyer-diplomat, and several other members. According to al-Anbari:
On 25 October ...I addressed the [Security] Council. I tried to
focus its attention on the legal requirement which the Council must
observe in adopting any resolution involving any use of force....
I believe the same argument applies today,. . .For under the Charter
of the United Nations any use of force is deemed to be an act of
aggression, save for three exceptional cases. The first case comes
under Article 51 and involves self-defence. Here the use of force is
limited to the period until the Security Council is seized of the
matter. Beyond that, any use of force must be deemed to be an act
of aggression. In the second case, the Security Council can act if
sanctions adopted in accordance with Article 41 prove to be ineffective or unenforceable. In such a case, the Council can act
collectively under Article 42 and can use force in accordance with
a mechanism provided for in Article 43.
In other words, in this case only collective action under the
command and control of the Security Council, in co-ordination with

19. See, e.g., Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 andPersian GulfDecision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L 516 (1991) (questioning minor U.N.

supervision of U.N. sanctioned action).
20. MOORE,supra note 2, at 149.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 151.
23. The text of this letter is reprinted in id. at 152.
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the Military Staff Committee, can lead to the use of force against any
country, and no individual Member State may be authorized to lynch
a particular country for any reason.
The third of the three cases to which I have referred arises under
Article 106 of the Charter. When the Security Council fails to reach
special agreements with Member countries to have forces of those
countries put under Security Council command, the four countries
signed the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, together with
France, and in consultation with the Members of the United Nations,
can undertake joint action against any country.
Those are the three exclusive cases in which the use of force
may legally be authorized by the Security Council. Regrettably,
however, the Council apparently thought that in this case the legal
requirements were disposable niceties.2 4
Moore may or may not have seen the text of al-Anbari's speech, but
he makes no reference to it at all. Instead, he makes comments in which
he rejects Professor Abram Chayes's argument that once the Security
Council has passed resolutions on any crisis, it automatically "has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. '2 5 Moore
argues that article 51 did not prohibit "further exercise of the right of
individual or collective defense pursuant to the final sentence of Article
51.,,26
Had Moore seen al-Anbari's statement quoted above, he probably
would have replied to al-Anbari's argument that any U.N. member acting
independently, apart from collective defense measures under the Security
Council, would be committing an act of aggression once the Security
Council is seized of the situation. Moore's further remarks about Chayes's
arguments are far-fetched and could hardly be considered interpretations
of the U.N. Charter.27
In retrospect, the dozen resolutions 28 passed by the Security Council
before the start of the Coalition War show that the role of the United

24. THE KUWAIT CRIsIs: BASIC DOCUMENTS 161-63 (E. Lauterpacht et al. eds., 1991).
25. MOORE, supra note 2, at 153.

26. Id. at 153-54.
27. See, e.g., id. at 155-56.
28. These resolutions are reprinted in MOORE, supra note 2, annex 3. They include: S.C.
Res. 660, supra note 10; S.C. Res. 661, supra note 12; S.C. Res. 662, supra note 13; S.C.

Res. 664, supra note 14; S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/665 (1990); S.C. Res. 666, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/666 (1990); S.C. Res. 667, supra note 15; S.C. Res. 669, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2942d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/669 (1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2943d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/670 (1990); S.C. Res. 674, supra note 16; S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2962d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/677 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, supra note 17.
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Nations in the liberation of Kuwait was unique. In the Iraq-Iran war,
which lasted over eight years, the Iraqi and Iranian forces were at each
other's throats in several pitched battles, yet the U.N. Security Council
made no move to invoke the relevant articles under chapter VII of the
Charter which would empower the Security Council to take action, as it
did in the case of the Kuwait crisis.
In the Kuwait crisis, the Security Council moved so quickly and
effectively that its action has been aptly considered unprecedented in the
history of the United Nations. Nor were the penalties imposed on Iraq the embargo, strict interdiction, and the bombing of Iraq's infrastructure
during the Coalition War - proportional to the objectives of the U.N.
Charter. The demands to change the Iraqi leadership and the indefinite
inspection of Iraq's military installations were excessive and came close
to violating the country's sovereignty and independence. As applied to
Iraq, the economic sanctions seem to have hurt innocent civilians far more
than the policymakers. 29 Moore holds different views about necessity and
proportionality, as he seems to maintain that Iraq has committed no less
damage in Kuwait than the U.N. economic embargo and military operations did in Iraq.30
Following his discussion of the enforcement of Resolution 678 (1990)
and the liberation of Kuwait, Moore addresses several other issues. Some
are not legal disputes such as, in his words, Iraq's "disinformation
campaign" and the dispute over the pricing of oil within OPEC. 3' The
disinformation campaigns were conducted by both sides, and Kuwait's
campaigns were surely more effective in Western countries than the Iraqi
campaigns. The oil pricing issue stemmed from differences on OPEC oil
quotas assigned to each country by which Iraq, supported by Iran and
Saudi Arabia, sought to abide, while Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates
felt differently.
No less important is the question of Iraq's attempted linkage of the
Gulf crisis with the Arab-Israeli dispute, to which Moore devotes a
section. 32 He correctly states that "there is no such linkage in law. '3 3 It is

29. See, e.g., Report to the Secretary-Generalon HumanitarianNeeds in Kuwait and Iraq
in the Immediate Post-CrisisEnvironment by a Mission to the Area Led by Mr. Martti Ahtisaari,
Under-SecretaryGeneralfor AdministrationandManagement, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/22366
(1991) (reporting "near apocalyptic" conditions in post-war Iraq); Louise Cainkar, The Gulf War,
Sanctions and the Lives ofIraqi Women, ARAB STUD. Q., Spring 1993, at 15) (recounting the

difficult health and sanitary condition with which Iraqi women had to cope because of the Gulf
War and U.N. sanctions).
30.
31.
32.
33.

See MOORE, supra note 2, at 156-67..
Id. at 189-90.
Id. at 223-26.
Id. at 223.
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a political question, Moore argues, which Iraq raised in order to enhance
its position vis-A-vis Kuwait.
There is, however, another side to the linkage question. As Tariq Aziz,
Iraqi Deputy Premier, reminded U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III,
at the meeting which they held in Geneva on January 9, 1991, the United
States had applied two different "standards" in its dealings with the two
disputes.34 One may well argue that the circumstances were entirely
different in each case, but in any dispute each side is entitled to be treated
in accordance with the same standard under any system of law.35
Following the liberation of Kuwait, a score of pending legal problems
reemerged, and a range of new issues arose, with which both Iraq and
Kuwait had to contend. Moore could not possibly deal in his work with
all of them. He has, however, dealt with some in which both sides were
directly involved. Perhaps the most important of these problems was Iraq's
claim to the sovereignty of Kuwait and settlement of the frontier dispute.
Moore became intimately involved in the demarcation of the frontier.
This is a highly controversial problem, as Iraq has not only refused to
accept the demarcation proposed by the U.N. Commission and approved
by the Security Council, but it has also continued to claim the sovereignty,
as well as the entire territory, of Kuwait as part of Iraqi territory. Moore
unfortunately does not deal with the work of the demarcation committee,
as he pays more attention to the controversy over Kuwait's sovereignty
which he considers to be the basis of other Iraqi claims.
As Moore rightly argues, Kuwait is a country recognized as an independent State. It was admitted to the United Nations in 1963 and to the
Arab League earlier in 1961. It was also recognized by Iraq in 1963 and
by many other countries, including all Arab countries, as a sovereign and
independent State. Iraq's claim, however, is based not on legal but on
historical grounds.
Kuwait was simply a part of the province of Basra (today a southern
province of Iraq) under Ottoman rule. Great Britain, which had entered
into agreement with the Shaykh of Kuwait in 1898 to protect his country
from foreign attack, considered it as an independent entity under its
"protection" when the Ottoman Empire collapsed after World War 1.36 In

34. For a discussion of, and excerpts from, the Baker-Aziz meeting, see MOHAMED HEIKAL,
ILLUSIONS OF TRIUMPH: AN ARAB VIEW OF THE GULF WAR 284-94 (1992).

35. On other aspects of the linkage question, see Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, The Politics of
Linkage: The Arab-Israeli Conflict in the Gulf War, in BEYOND THE STORM: A GULF CRISIS
READER 183 (Phyllis Bennis & Michel Moushabeck eds., 1991) [hereinafter BEYOND THE
STORM].

36. For a discussion of Iraq's historical claim to Kuwait, see MOORE, supra note 2, at

201-23. See also Majid Khadduri, Iraq's Claim to the Sovereignty of Kuwayt, 23 N.Y.U. J.
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1923, under the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey renounced its claim to all the
Arab territories that it might have inherited from the Ottoman Empire. As
Iraq has recognized Kuwait's sovereignty, Iraq's claim to Kuwait as part
of the province of Basra is necessarily reduced to a historical claim.
History, however, has never been regarded under international law as valid
evidence of legal rights. For this reason, Iraq's invasion and subsequent
annexation of Kuwait in 1990 were violations of Kuwait's territorial
sovereignty and independence, and contrary to the principles of international law and the U.N. Charter which prohibit resort to force for the
settlement of disputes.
In its claim to the sovereignty of Kuwait, however, Iraq had raised,
long before its invasion of Kuwait, the question of the legitimacy of the
frontiers between the two countries on the grounds that, before Iraq had
achieved independence, the frontiers between the two countries were laid
down by the British authorities, and that after independence all attempts
at reaching agreement on frontiers with Kuwait were never finalized.
Kuwait, however, maintains that Iraq's recognition of its sovereignty in
1963, and its admission to the Arab League and the United Nations, imply
the acceptance of the validity of Kuwait's existing frontiers.37 True,
Kuwait's frontiers with Saudi Arabia have been settled since 1922, under
the Uqayr Conference and a treaty, signed and ratified by their rulers.38
But the Iraq-Kuwait frontier is arguably not so settled. The instruments
dealing with the Iraqi-Kuwaiti frontier, signed and ratified by Kuwait,
have only been signed and not yet ratified by Iraq. Moore and a number
of other writers, however, take the position that the agreements concluded
by the British authorities with Kuwait, as well as the agreement of 1963,
were valid and binding on Iraq.39
Before we examine the set of agreements relevant to frontiers,
perhaps a little background would be useful. The first agreement dealing
with Kuwait's frontiers and enlarging its territory may be found in the
elaborate British-Ottoman Draft Convention of July 29, 1913, by virtue
of which the city-State of Kuwait was defined in the form of "a
semi-circle with the town of Koweit in the center" surrounded by Khawr
al-Zubayr. 40 The islands of Warba, Bubiyan, and all other adjacent islands
were included in this zone. As this Cbnvention was not ratified when
World War I broke out, Kuwait's territory did not include the islands.

INT'L L. & POL. 5 (1990).
37. See Moore, supra note 2, at 204-07.
38. Id. at 216-17.

39. Id. at 202.
40. Id. annex 17 (reprinting excerpts from: Convention Respecting the Persian Gulf and
Adjacent Territories, July 29, 1913, U.K.-Turk.).
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After the war, Iraq passed under British control. In an exchange of
letters between Sir Percy Cox, then High Commissioner for Iraq, and the
Shaykh of Kuwait, in 1923, the frontiers were defined roughly as stated
under the British-Ottoman Convention of 1913. 4' On the basis of this
exchange of letters, the frontiers were set. But no formal action was taken
by Iraq to either ratify or authorize Cox's action, and the agreement was
never finalized. At the time, Great Britain was the Mandatory Power
appointed by the League of Nations to "render[] ... administrative advice
and assistance," under article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant.42 The
British High Commissioner, on behalf of his government, would also
advise the King of Iraq "on all important matters affecting the international and financial obligations" of the British Government, according to
the Treaty of Alliance with Iraq (1922). 43
Cox's standing vis-A-vis Iraq, accordingly, was only in an advisory
capacity, and his exchange of letters could not be binding on Iraq. The
letters in question were never discussed by the Council of the League of
Nations, which recommended Iraq's candidacy for membership to the
League Assembly in 1932. Nor was the frontier question ever raised
during the discussion of Iraq's admission to League membership. No
evidence thus exists to support Moore's opinion, as ratification was
constitutionally required in order to be binding on Iraq.
Moore also opines that Iraq's recognition of Kuwait's sovereignty and
the unratified agreement of 1963 confirm the validity of the frontiers as
defined under General Nuri's exchange of letters in 1932. 44 The existence
of the Minutes of a meeting between the Iraqi Premier and the Kuwaiti
Foreign Minister in 1963, in which Kuwait's sovereignty and de facto
frontiers were recognized, does not necessarily finalize the frontier
agreement of 1963, because the Minutes of the meeting between the Iraqi
Premier and the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister were neither approved by the
45
Cabinet nor ratified by the head of State, so as to be binding on Iraq.
The sovereignty and independence of a country may be recognized by an
exchange of letters or even by a declaration of the head of State or
government, but frontiers must be defined and demarcated on the basis
of an agreement acceptable to both sides in accordance with their own
41. Id. at 216-17, 243 n.64.
22, 1 4.
43. For the text of the Anglo-Iraq Treaty, see Treaty of Alliance Between Great Britain
and Iraq, Oct. 10, 1922, art. 4, 35 L.N.T.S. 13, 15, reprintedin 2 J.C. HUREWITZ, THE MIDDLE
EAST AND NORTH AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 310-11 (1979).
44. MOORE, supra note 2, at 204-07.
45. The 1963 Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq are
reprinted in MOORE, supra note 2, annex 21.
42. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.
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constitutional procedures in order to be binding. In a peace treaty between
Iraq and Kuwait, the frontier question might be resolved if its terms were

freely negotiated. If its terms were ever imposed on either side, even by
the United Nations, recurrence of frontier disputes would be exceedingly
difficult to avoid.
II. FREEDMAN AND KARSH'S The Gulf Conflict i99o-1991:
Diplomacy and War in the New World Order
Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh's work, like Moore's Crisis
in the Gulf, is a book on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.6 Freedman, an
authority on military strategy and nuclear weapons, is a professor of "War
Studies" at King's College in London; and Karsh, author of several studies
on Soviet relationships with the Middle East, is a lecturer at the same
college. Both authors may be regarded as specialists in the international
field. Unlike Moore's work, the subject of the Freedman-Karsh book is
not, strictly speaking, a legal analysis of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Like
Moore's book, however, The Gulf Conflict views the invasion as a
challenge to the West and to world order, as defined and determined under
the Charter of the United Nations. The authors of the two works agree that
the primary purpose of the Western response to Iraq's action was to
reestablish order and security by compelling Iraq to withdraw its forces
through the mechanism of the United Nations.
While Moore deals with aspects of the Iraq-Kuwait relationships as
State acts, Freedman and Karsh provide their readers with a more comprehensive account of the events in the region and their implications on
both the regional and international planes. In brief, the story of the
conflict, as dealt with in the Freedman-Karsh book, began when Iraq
invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and ended when Kuwait was formally
declared liberated on February 9, 1991. Thus the period covered in their
work is a little over six months. As the conflict was the product of
longstanding disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, the two writers provide
an introductory chapter on the origins of the conflict and a final chapter
on its consequences.
The conflict is dealt with in detail, not only addressing the role of the
Western powers that participated in passing the Security Council resolutions, but also with the role of countries that took part in implementing
the resolutions, which led to the liberation of Kuwait. The two authors
also provide a nearly complete account of the events in Iraq and the way

46. LAWRENCE FREEDMAN & EFRAlM KARsH, THE GULF CONFLICT, 1990-1991: DIPLOMACY AND WAR IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

41 (1993).
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in which Iraqi forces administered Kuwait from the time Iraq occupied
the country at the beginning of August 1990, to the time of liberation six
months later. The Freedman-Karsh work is essentially narrative in scope
and method and is less analytical than Moore's book. For students of
international law who are not fully acquainted with the historical and
political background of the Iraq-Kuwait dispute - indeed, for anyone who
intends to read the two works - this reviewer advises reading the
Freedman-Karsh book before Moore's work.
It is perhaps unnecessary to reiterate the critical comments made
earlier on Moore's work which are on the whole also relevant to the work
by Freedman and Karsh. Because the authors of the two books are
Western writers, their treatment of the subject is from a Western perspective. There are, however, some important differences between the two
works, as well as between the authors, which might be of interest to
readers. Moore is more acquainted with Kuwait and its leaders, while his
information about Iraq is limited. He also frequently uses rather harsh
judgments reflecting the emotional views of Kuwaiti leaders. Freedman
and Karsh, in contrast, are well acquainted with Iraq's history and political
development and have provided much more useful information about Iraq
(though not without highly critical remarks about Saddam Husayn) as both
authors, especially Karsh (who has published a book on Husayn47 ), have
used not only Western sources but also some (though more limited) source
material from Iraq.
Saddam Husayn has been described by most Western writers, especially in the press and media, as a radical Pan-Arab leader, opposed to the
West and Israel and an ally of the Soviet Union. The invasion of Kuwait,
some held, was at the top of his agenda, as part of his ideological
Pan-Arab program. Freedman and Karsh, are perhaps among the very few
Western writers who argue that Iraq's dwindling oil income and Kuwait's
refusal to assist Iraq financially, were among Iraq's primary motives,
despite the fact that the claims to the islands of Warba and Bubiyan were
long standing disputes. The two authors make it quite clear that Iraq's
needs for reconstruction and development after the war with Iran were
immediate drives and should be distinguished from the frontier and
territorial disputes. Had Husayn's aim been to acquire the islands and
modify frontiers, he would probably not have gone beyond the acquisition
of these targets and his action might not have precipitated the "crisis in
the Gulf."
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As Freedman and Karsh rightly argue, the Ba'th Party regime in Iraq
was and still is a secular regime; its aim was greater economic development of the country following Western patterns, and it stood opposed to
the concepts of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and other fundamentalist
movements. (It is important to note that only after the West rose in
support of Kuwait, did Saddam Husayn appeal to fundamentalists as a
weapon against Western powers.)
There are several other illuminating remarks to which Freedman and
Karsh call attention; for example, the impact of the Iraq-Iran war on the
Ba'th regime and on conditions in Iraq. True, Iraq nominally won the war
with Iran, but the economic conditions in the country have considerably
deteriorated after the war and thousands of prisoners of war were not
released by Iran, contrary to Iraqi expectations.48 In more than one visit
to Baghdad after the war, it became quite clear to this reviewer that any
nominal gain in the war with Iran did not diminish public frustrations with
the country's neglected internal conditions. The author learned from
persons in positions of authority about their frustrations with Kuwait's
refusal to abide by the OPEC quotas and to limit oil overproduction.
Freedman and Karsh argue that Kuwait's policy of overproduction was
based on "market pressures."49 "Only by allowing prices to fall," they
explain, "could oil recapture its share of the world energy market." 50 But
the consequences of Kuwait's policy of overproduction adversely affected
Iraq's financial position. Kuwait's insistence on pursuing such a policy
despite Iraq's protests prompted the Iraqi leadership to suspect that Kuwait
was deliberately encouraged by Western Powers (particularly the United
States and England) to undermine Iraq's position in world financial
markets.
Freedman and Karsh discuss in detail how the Western powers, slowly
but effectively, came to the conclusion that they had to use force to
compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam Husayn, though prudent
and calculating (as he is described by the two authors), was probably
driven more by pride and frustration than by reason to settle his account
with Kuwait by resort to force. This reviewer agrees with the two authors
that at the outset, the Bush Administration sought to cooperate with Iraq
as a moderate power which would stand against the radical revolutionary
regime in Iran. But Congress, under the influence of pressure groups,
sought to deny export trade with Iraq (even in nonmilitary commodities)
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on the grounds of human rights violations and its alleged growing military
build-up in chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry.
Meanwhile, the press and media launched a vigorous campaign against
Iraq, and the difference between facts and fanciful reports about the
situation became difficult to distinguish. President Bush, on the basis of
the "facts" provided by his intelligence agencies, began to take more
seriously the damaging impact of the press reports on the forthcoming
presidential elections. Husayn did not make it any easier for Bush (nor,
indeed, for himself or his country) when he made highly critical speeches
in early 1990, denouncing U.S. neocolonial and imperial policies in the
Middle East. This response was partly because he did not fully understand
how the press could indulge in such a high-pressured campaign against
Iraq without the tacit encouragement of the U.S. Government, despite
efforts to explain the nature and freedom of the Western press to him.
Freedman and Karsh seem to have considered the post-Gulf crisis
following the liberation of Kuwait to be a new era. Some writers must
have been disappointed with Bush's "New World Order," as it proved
empty in content after the liberation of Kuwait. Freedman and Karsh,
realizing that more profound changes were expected to be regional, devote
a chapter, entitled "Saddam Survives," to the internal changes in Iraq. No
comparable chapter is devoted to other countries, such as Kuwait, where
profound changes have also occurred.
The authors deal with three major issues - the survival of Saddam
Husayn, the Shi'ite uprising in southern Iraq, and the Kurdish rebellion
in northern Iraq. True, the two revolts were suppressed partly by the
Republican Guard and partly because of the lack of outside support due
to Western concern about the dissolution of Iraq into three smaller States.
But what is the solution for the de facto existence of three separate
subunits? At present they are nominally held together, partly by Saddam
Husayn's own leadership and partly by the refusal of the Western powers
to allow the dissolution to take place. If Husayn disappears from the
scene, is it likely that further uprisings in the North and South might be
attempted? No substitute unifying leadership has yet emerged. The opposition leaders outside Iraq do not seem to have a significant following inside
the country. The "problem," as the two authors see it, is Saddam Husayn,
himself. In their view, he is now the only available leader who can keep
the country united, but he is persona non grata to most Western leaders.
No Security Council resolution has yet been contemplated to resolve the
domestic "problem," in Iraq, in contrast to the mandatory resolutions that
were rushed to deal drastically with the Gulf crisis without giving Arab
leaders enough time to find a peaceful solution. The Iraqi people continue
to pay the price for the Gulf War, the U.N. sanctions, and the ongoing
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domestic problems. 5 One can but hope that the legal literature on the
subject will begin to consider these key issues.
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